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Abstract
This   paper   argues   that   there   are   qualifying   grounds   for   global
governance   to   make   a   contribution   to   the   study   of   International
Relations.   Starting   with   the   Westphalian   state   model   and   its
compromises, it moves on to outline the realist and liberal approaches.
Next, it frames the concept of plain governance, expanding on its
varieties of public and global scope. Then, it sets up a toolbox to
address   World   Politics   issues   from   the   standpoint   of   governance.
Afterwards, it lays the foundations of two functions by which global
governance may bridge some gaps left open by realism and liberalism.
The first one involves the fiduciary role in international relations. The
second   displays   how   global   governance   structures   carry   out   the
brokerage of asymmetric information. 
Key   words:   governance,   global   governance,   public   governance,
asymmetric information, fiduciary role, realism and liberalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Narrowly speaking, by International Relations is denoted the study of
relationships arising from nation-states. A broader meaning, as Lawson
points out, focuses on interactions and linkages between state-based
actors across national borders. From this latter viewpoint, both nation-
states and non-state organizations are key players in international
relations
2.
Making good use of this line of research, our paper puts forth that a new
field of learning and practice, called Global Governance, becomes helpful
to sharpen up the subject-matter of international relations. 
The roadmap to accomplish our target will be the following:
In section 1, we will outline the main features usually attached to the
so-called Westphalian-State model, stressing how often it has been
compromised since 1648 up to date. It is for section 2 to develop the
main tenets of the realist approach, and for section 3 to deal with the
liberal approach to international relationships.   
Section 4 intends to frame the semantics of governance, while sections
5 and 6 enlarge upon public and global governance, respectively. 
Section 7 shows how the governance approach may prove propitious for
the   field   of   international   relations,   by   working   out   the   economic
approach   to   institutions;   the   power-concentration  paradox;   political
determinants of governance; governance indexes; international law and
regimes;  and, finally, the strongly  related issues of accountability,
transparency and good practices.
We are going to underline two broad functions governance structures
are expected to carry out. The first one, the fiduciary role, which will be
examined in section 8, while we are going to look into the second one,
the brokerage of asymmetric information, in section 9.   
This paper claims three humble contributions: 
a) firstly, it sets up a clear semantics for global governance; 
b) secondly, it chooses and connects some tools of analysis that turn
out to be useful when coping with world politics issues; 
2 Stephanie Lawson (2003). International Relations. Polity, Blackwell, Oxford, UK. An
insightful approach to international relations from the perspective of a Latin-American
country can be found in Escude (1999).
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c) thirdly, it lays the foundations for two functions at the core of
global governance, namely the fiduciary role, and the brokerage of
asymmetric information.
1.  THE WESTPHALIAN STATE
The Peace of Westphalia (1648) stands for a watershed in History and
Political Science. It adds to a new framework for the understanding of
international relations, and it is grounded on two statements:
 there are a set of single states that behave like autonomous and
rational actors any time they relate with each other;
 it is for these states to assert a distinctive territory, within which
they exert full authority and control, that is to say, they become
sovereign.
The territorial issue amounts to the exercise of political authority over
a geographical unit. Besides, autonomy  constrains any state to not
intrude in the domestic affairs of others. 
Although   this   arrangement   of   autonomous   and   sovereign   states
eventually   settled   down   in   mainstream   political   science,   it   seems
advisable to regard the concept of Westphalian states, and even its
consequences, as a benchmark from which we can get access to a
better view of what is going on in world politics.
At this juncture, we have to bear in mind the line of analysis introduced
by Krasner (1995) who argued that the application of this arrangement
for the international system evolved into a long standing pattern of
behavior at variance with the prevailing meaning earmarked to the
Peace of Westphalia. More often than not, we witness compromises of
Westphalia rather than its outright fulfillment.    
Furthermore, Krasner contended that those compromises stem from
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Exhibit 1  Driving Forces behind the Compromises of Westphalia
6
Driving Forces behind the Compromises of Westphalia
Conventions they   are   voluntary   agreements   by   which   states
compromise, even to constrain domestic policies or
acquiesce to external monitoring. Conventions are not
contingent   on   counterparts   behavior.   Furthermore,
they   are   pareto-improving   (since   they   make   one
party, at least, better-off without making worse-off
the others).
Examples: The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of
all   Forms   of   Discrimination   Against   Women;   the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Contracting Actors   might   agree   to   compromise   Westphalia’s
essence in pursuit of political gains. The actions of
somes   states   are   regarded   contingent   upon   what
counterparts   could   decide.   Contracts   become
pareto-improving.
Examples:   Any   sovereign   lending;   the   European
Union; the Exclusive Economic Zone for the Oceans.
Coercion Stronger states threaten weaker ones so as to make
the latter comply with the preferences of the former;
otherwise,   domestic   autonomy   could   be   in   peril.
These   arrangements   do   not   become   pareto-
improving but they are contingent.
Examples:   Economic   sanctions   to   deviant   states
(Uganda, Turkey, South Africa, Cuba).
Imposition Weaker states must agree that the best decision to
keep   their   interests   on   the   safe   side   consists   in
following   the   stronger’s   preferences.   Such
compromises   are   neither   pareto-improving   nor
contingent.
Examples: USA interventions in the Caribbean and
Central American states; Soviet Union interventions
in   the   Warsaw   Treaty   nations;   United   Nations
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2. THE REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Although there have been many attempts to explain and forecast what
take place in world politics, two academic traditions stand out from
numberless competitors. In this section, we single out the high spots of
realism, leaving for the next one a matching review of liberalism: 
· THE WORLD IS ANARCHIC
Beyond  and   above   the   Westphalian   states   there   is   no
authority   to   bind   them   together   or   to   make   them
accountable for their decision-making
3.
· STATES ALWAYS BID FOR POWER
At the root of international relations, we always find a
recurrent bid for power among Westphalian states, which
behave as political actors and rational units, and make the
most of opportunistic behavior and deceit. In this line of
argument, “national interests” are defined as the acquisition




In the realist frame of mind,  coercion and imposition
make for compromises with the Westphalia arrangement
(Exhibit 1).
· A PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF HUMAN BEINGS
Conflict and war are predicated upon the assumption of a
negative anthropology by which human nature is wicked and
deceitful.
· MILITARY POWER AND DIPLOMACY ARE KEY DRIVERS
If left on their own, institutions and law fail to prevent
conflict and war; military power and diplomacy are the tools
of the trade to pursuit sustainable international relations. 
3 Kegley (1995) provides a contrast between realism and liberalism, while a more
detailed development in Holsti (1995). 
4 Security issues and a broad viewpoint about the tenets of realism are explored in
Jervis (1998).
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· STABILITY OUTGROWS FROM NATIONAL POWERS
The international system lays bare how powers strive for
hegemony;   furthermore,   it   is   agreed   that,   in   certain
contexts, bipolarity could be more stable than any multi-
polar arrangement
5. As a matter of fact, when states seek
for   the   maximizing   of   their   power,   stability   ensues
eventually.
· OFFENSE AND DEFENSE
In the offense-defense variety of realism, it is asserted that
when defense is more feasible than offense, security is
better, and there are incentives to cooperation; it is for the
great powers guarantee other states’s security by means of
alliances and defensive military covenants
6. 
· RELATIVE GAINS PREVAIL OVER ABSOLUTE GAINS
Answering criticism from institutionalist quarters, some neo-
realists have stressed not only the issue of absolute gains
arising from cooperation, but also the distribution of those
gains relative to each of the bargaining partners. They do
so,   even   to   the   extent   of   regarding   the   latter   more
compelling   than   the   former   to   explaining   failures   in
international cooperation
7. 
3. THE LIBERAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A conspicuous challenger of the realist approach has currently been the
so-called liberal standpoint. It shares with realism the fact that it is not
a   single-purpose   theory   but   an   array   of   subsequent   approaches,
following one after another, and each of them ratcheting up the insights
and   analysis   of   the   former   to   new   environments,   demands   and
problems. However, there is a common thread that runs through all of
5 Waltz (1995) put it this way “In an anarchic realm, structures are defined in terms
of their major units. International structures vary with significant changes in the
number of great powers. Great powers are marked off from others by the combined
capabilities (or power) they command”
6  A  good   review  of  this  subject  can  be  found   in   Walt  (1998),  who  discusses
international relations as taking place in one world, whereas many theoretical worlds
contest for a sensible explanation.
7 About anarchy and the limits of cooperation, Grieco (1988) proves helpful.
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them, disclosing a set of common assumptions among which we are
going to pick out the next ones:
· BOTH   STATES   AND   NON-STATES   ORGANIZATIONS   ARE   KEY
PLAYERS
It focuses not only on states, but also in non-state private
organizations (like the multinational corporations), state-
grounded transnational institutions, and social groups that
cut across boundaries.
· ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE MATTER
Interdependence grows stronger and widespread, to the
extent of discouraging a recurring environment of war and
permanent mistrust among states; security issues are not
so   important   as   realism   holds;   freedom,   prosperity,
constitutional rights, the environment, even the rights of
minorities seem to play a conclusive role in international
relations.
· COMPROMISING WESTPHALIA
To a liberal mind,  conventions and contracts  make for
compromises with the Westphalia world order (see Exhibit
1).
· DOMESTIC AFFAIRS ARE DOUBLE-EDGED 
Political processes within each state may be consequential
in international relations. It was Gourevitch (1978) who
argued that although the international system becomes an
explanatory variable of domestic policy, it also holds the
other way round
8.
· AN OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF HUMAN BEINGS
The   underlying   anthropology   in   the   liberal   approach   is
positive: human beings are good; in general, any strand of
liberalism upholds an outright belief in progress. 
8  As Gourevtich contended: “Instead of being a  cause of international politics,
domestic structure may be a consequence of it. International systems, too, become
causes instead of consequences.”
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· TRUST IN DEMOCRACY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
The rule of law, the tenets of representative democracy and
the workings of international institutions make on credible
commitments and curb the selfishness of single states
9.
Democratic states are prone to peace, to which they commit
themselves. 
· POLITICAL LIBERALISM HERITAGE
It is for political liberalism to underline the expansion of
human freedom and democratization, and it fosters market
capitalism and technology as a matter of course.
· SELF-DETERMINATION
The Wilsonian principle of “self-determination”, as Kegley
(1995)
10  has cogently contended, seems worthy of being
definitely embodied in international relations. 
· STATES´PREFERENCES CHANGE AND PEOPLES LEARN
AS preferences of states are not fixed forever, they can
change. As Levy (1994) asserted: “ experiential learning is
a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s
beliefs)   or   the   development   of   new   beliefs,   skills,   or
procedures are a result of observation and interpretation of
experience (…) Learning inferences from experience get
encoded into governmental institutions and decision-making
procedures.”
4. GOVERNANCE AS A FIELD OF LEARNING AND PRACTICE
Both   realism   and   liberalism   can   be   regarded   as   complementary
theoretical   attempts   that   have   made   significant   inroads   on   the
understanding of world politics. Although each approach focuses on the
same subject matter, they do not ask the same questions. Therefore, as
9 On this account, Peace in the Liberal World: Does Democracy Matter? (1995) by
Onuf and Johnson is clarifying. 
10 An extensive attempt to reappraise Wilsonian´s beliefs and proposals can be found
in   Charles Kegley (1995)  The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World
Politics: An Introduction.
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their assumptions are wide apart, it is not surprising that enduring weak
points arise now and then, turning their contributions (as many scholars
have pointed out) rather cursory, falling short of good predictions and
interpretation power
11.
For instance, realism undervalues international change and progress,
while liberalism disregards not only the role of power but also the fact
that transitions to democracy may be disruptive. The former fails to
understand that legitimacy, even for military purposes, is essential. The
latter lacks the perception that for a democratic regime to survive,
debate  and safeguards should be granted to  military and security
apprehensions, as September 11 brought to light
12.     
Interdependence and globalism exert pressure on building patterns for
cooperation and trust. This task requires the design of new political
agents   under   the   guise   of   global   organizations   and   institutional
arrangements whose main task must be sought, as this paper argues, in
the perfomance of fiduciary roles on global grounds, and the brokerage
of asymmetric information among international political actors. Neither
realism nor liberalism does qualify as suitable viewpoints to cope with
these environments, although both perspectives may prove extremely
fruitful in their partnership to shed complementary light and reason in
world politics.
So, interdependence and globalism have wedged a gap between the
traditional models of international relations. The governance approach
intends   to   fill   that   gap   and   nurture   the   dialogue   between   those
traditionally contending sides.
Cutting down to essentials, this section is going to introduce the notion
of governance, while I leave for sections 5 and 6 the analysis of public
and global governance, respectively.    
Governance is a point in question to which many contributors in social
sciences and practitioners (including lawmakers) have been giving their
best effort and proficiency. However, it has still not become a full-
fledged discipline. 
In the corporate realm, for instance, research dates back only to thirty
years. On the other hand, systematic study in global governance has
evolved along an even shorter span of time. Whereas public governance
11 There is a wide array of claims and counterclaims from both schools of thought,
some of which are fully reviewed in Walt (1998).
12 A fairly good summary and discussion of this topic in Snyder (2004)
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has been topical for ages, its expansion in a sort of independent branch
of knowledge is not long past. 
From a methodological viewpoint, therefore, mixed feelings arise when
trying to set up a definition of governance. Rather than looking for a
discipline, perhaps a more cautious frame of mind seems to regard the
whole   subject   as   an   advancing   field   of   learning   and   practice,   a
distinctive variety of what amounts to be the scientific style of inquiry
and   validation
13.   On   these   grounds,   we   are   going   to   set   forth   a
definition. 
Definition 1 Field of Learning and Practice
By a Field of Learning and Practice, it is understood a purposeful,
enduring  and rational  endeavor around a particular  subject whose
underlying tasks are
 to look for principles and goals attached to that subject;
 to provide an explicit semantics for the core of the subject;
 to draw basic and derived statements from a coherent logical
system;
 to design reliable procedures to deal with focal problems in actual
practice;
 to gather empirical evidence on which to ground either basic or
derived statements.
  
It goes without saying that a definition of governance ought to supply a
framework as broad as to give account of private organizations (for-
profit or non-profit), state-owned firms, governmental organizations,
international   institutions
14,   even   multinational   arrangements   among
countries (as in the case of EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR). Also, we must
point to  non-state  organizations that  have become  key players  in
transnational international relationships.
13 In this section, we are taking advantage of our former paper The Semantics of
Governance, University of Cema, Working Paper Series, number 245, (see Apreda,
2003). 
14 For instance, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
12It is for Global Governance to Sharpen Up International Relations                 Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
Hence, the notion of governance calls for a streamlined definition to
embody the expected functions that intuition and scholarship attach to
the tasks of governing organizations or systems.
Definition 2 Governance
By Governance we are to understand a field of learning and practice
whose main targets are
 
· the search of principles, rules, procedures and good practices that
allow organizations to be efficiently run within the constraints of
evolving and changing institutions;
· the   design,   implementation   and   following-up   of   functional
mechanisms   for   representation,   voting,   accountability,
transparency, countervailing monitoring, incentives and standards
of performance;
· the management not only of well-founded modes of wielding
power   but   also   of   conflicts   of   interest;   procedures   to   grant
enforceable decision-making authority.
The advantage of this definition lies on the general format it conveys, by
which we can address particular shades of meaning and functions when
dealing either with the private or the public sectors. This layer of study
and application of governance structures, within single nation-states,
will be denoted as level-1 governance (Exhibit 2).   
Against a more general background, still beyond the one pertaining
organizations,  Governance  may   also   be   defined   as   the   art   and
techniques to care for the way a system, even a single situation, may
work as a matter of course.    
5. PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
Governance in the public sector
15 of any country points to the running of
the State, taking into account the mechanisms by which the government
should work well.  
15 Apreda (2005c) supplies a detailed viewpoint on Public Governance  
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As a matter of concern, Government has been a field of study and
practice since human beings built up structures and arrangements for
living in society. But it was when civil and representative governments
sprung in the XVII century 
16 that the subject matter reached the stage
of   a   scholarly   field   of   inquiry   and   practice,   to   be   undertaken
independently from philosophical analysis. 
Exhibit 2    Level–1    Governances
Nevertheless, the interest in public governance goes further back only
two or three decades. Hence, it focuses neither in what the nature of
government   adds   up   to,   nor   intends   to   provide   a   theory   of   the
management of government, both topics primarily found in the realm of
the Political Science. Instead, public governance attempts to cope with a
set of distinctive issues that overlap with Economics, Political Science,
International Relations and Law.   
After these prefatory remarks, we can spell out the meaning of Public
Governance
17.
16 We refer here to the Peace of Westphalia, with which we dealt in section 1.
17 Contrast with definition 2 above. For a comprehensive account, see Apreda (2003,
2004, 2005c).
14






WHEN WE DEAL WITH SINGLE GOVERNANCES, EITHER IN 
THE PRIVATE OR THE PUBLIC SECTOR, AND WITHIN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF A NATION-STATE, WE CARRY OUT 
RESEARCH OR PRACTICE IN WHAT CAN BE CALLED     
LEVEL–1  GOVERNANCE.It is for Global Governance to Sharpen Up International Relations                 Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
 Definition 3 Public Governance
By Public Governance is meant the governance of those organizations
in representative democracies with a distinctive focus on the following
matters:
 The Founding Charter, Bill of Rights and the legal system of the
underlying political system.
 Institutional architecture for representation mechanisms; the
fiduciary role; the exercise of authority; the structure of power
division; the whole array of checks and balances.
 The processes by which government officials, representatives,
and   the   judiciary   are   elected,   appointed,   monitored,   and
replaced; the design of the governmental bureaucracy and its
management.
 Integrity of the Judiciary; law enforcement; property rights.
 Accountability,   transparency,   conflicts   of   interests,   good
practices.
 Rent-seeking,   soft-budget   constraint,   political   clientelism,
state-capture, corruption.
 The role of collective action: groups of interest, veto-players,
gate-keepers, media, political parties.
 Building up linkages with corporate governances as well as
global governances.
For the purposes of illustration, it seems worthy of being noticed the
efforts made by the United Nations in shaping a sound approach to
public governance.  For the global institution, the challenge facing all
societies is to create a system of governance that promotes, supports
and sustains human development:
“Being participatory, sustainable, accountable, legitimate, acceptable to the people,
tolerating, and transparent. Promoting equity and equality, gender balance, able to
develop the resources and methods of governance, to define and take ownership of
national solutions, to deal with temporal issues. Service-oriented, operating by the
rule   of   law,   efficient   and   effective   in   the   use   of   resources”.   [United   Nations,
Discussion paper number 2, 1997]
6. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
As from the 80s, globalization processes achieved both a scope and
scale as former globalization experiences had never had. Not only were
there   technological   innovations   fostering   a   borderless   world,   but
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changes   in   the   way   companies   and   governments   broadened   their
purposes, and involved themselves in worldly affairs. Demand for, or
supply   of,   goods   and   services   became   transnational   endeavors.
Furthermore,   security   concerns   followed   suit   as   well.   Therefore,   a
complex network of new relationships were able to make a claim for
governance at a global extent, whose main features were, according to
Gilpin (2002), 
· open markets;
· unrestricted capital flows;
· pervasive activity and influence from multinational corporations.
It   was   an   upside   of   this   perspective   to   stress   that   multinational
corporations carried out a decisive bearing in single issues like trade
levels and location of economic activities, issues that can easily be
embedded in the field of corporate governance. By the same token, a
downside of this approach consisted in a constrained focus on economic
matters. 
Redressing this narrow viewpoint, it has been evolving an institutional
global governance point of view undertaken by the United Nations,
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the OECDE, and also
a distinctive set of scholars [for instance, Scholte (2000) and Kettle
(2000) ] who voiced two matters of concern:
i. Globalization   conveys   the   emergence   of   post-sovereign
governance, because states cannot be sovereign in the traditional
sense. At least, this seems to be a new example of compromising
Westphalia
18.
ii. The rise of supra-territoriality has promoted moves toward multi-
layered governance, where regulatory competences are widely
dispersed across the layers of sub-state, state, or supra-state
arrangements and agencies.
The Commission on Global Governance of the United Nations, frames
the concept this way:
 “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse
interests may accommodate, and cooperative action may be taken. It includes
formal   institutions   and  regimes   empowered   to   enforce   compliance,   as   well   as
informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive
to be in their interest. […]
18 On this regard, the reader is referred to section 1.
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[…] At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental
relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental
organizations, citizen’s movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital
market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged
influence.”
Bearing in mind the previous remarks, we lay down a contextualized
semantics for global governance
19.
Definition 4 Global Governance
By  Global   Governance  is   meant   the   governance   of   supra-state
organizations by means of a two-tiered design of overlapping issues and
problems, namely
a) those arising from the nature of each organization (either states, GOs
and NGOs):
 founding charter, statutes and by-laws;
 institutional   architecture,   division   of   powers,   bureaucracies,
checks and balances;
 representation and accountability;
 fiduciary role and resolution of conflicts of interests;
 collective action mechanisms; 
 persuasion and participation;
b) those arising from the interplay among state and non state actors in
the context of global interdependence:
 domestic and international institutional arrangements;
 corporate governance constraints;
 public governance constraints;
 statements of good practices and performance yardsticks to be
followed either in the private or in the public domains 
As we can see from Exhibit 3, global governance is multi-layered, since
it involves problems usually attached to public and private governance.
However, it goes beyond that point, since multiple actors relate each
other  in  the   context  of globalism and interdependence.  Therefore,
research and practice focusing on these topics will be referred as level-2
governance.
19 Background on global governance also in Apreda (2003).
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THIS VIEW POINT MAKES FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
AT A LEVEL–2 GOVERNANCE
MULTIPLE ACTORS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS THAT CUT ACROSS NATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES 
Exhibit 3  Level–2 governances  
6.1 GLOBALISM AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE 
Although complex interdependence had become a fact of life for most of
the XX century, it gained a widespread status after the Second World
War, reaching a clear semantics in the last twenty years when scholars
and practitioners linked interdependence with globalism (See Exhibit 4).
Complex   interdependence  must   be   regarded   a   multidimensional
phenomena, and consists of a state of affairs whose main features,
according to Nye (2004b) are now to be mentioned:
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Source: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda  -  Cegopp  -  University of Cema





ACTOR 1 POLITICAL 
ACTOR 2
Exhibit 4   International Relations and  Interdependence
a) there are multiple channels between societies, with multiple state
and non-state actors;
b) there are multiple issues, albeit they are not shaped in distinctive
hierarchies or levels of priority;
c) the use of force or threats among states becomes more and more
irrelevant.
On the other hand, Nye regards globalism as 
“a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multi-
continental distances.” 
20
20  While interdependence is depicted as a state of affairs, scholars rather think
globalism as a state of the world, a viewpoint that places globalism as a particular
type of interdependence. 
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It goes without saying that linkages come about through capital and
goods transactions, information exchange, and work force migration.
Furthermore, the increase or decrease of globalism in a distinctive
period of History, give rise to globalization or de-globalization waves,
respectively. For the sake of example, globalism increased after the
Second World War, while it decreased during the Great Depression of
the 1930s
21.
7. HOW THE GOVERNANCE APPROACH MAY CONTRIBUTE 
TO THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
For the last thirty years there has been an impressive academic and
political concern with governance issues. As long as representative
democracies   spread   over   the   world,   albeit   through   a   variegated
assortment of examples, this approach has become more user-friendly
and functional to deal with manifold problems. The purpose of this
section is to bring to the surface some tools of analysis that seem
consequential to international relations issues:
i. the economic approach to institutions; 
ii. the power-concentration paradox; 
iii. political determinants of governance;
iv. governance indexes; 
v. international law and regimes;
vi. accountability, transparency and good practices. 
7.1  THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS
Organizations, in general, cannot be isolated from their institutional
backgrounds. This linkage, suitably labeled “Institutional Approach”
(or   “institutional   economics”   for   some   quarters),   has   widely   been
studied   for   the   last   thirty   years.   Being   North   (1990)   a   foremost
authoritative source, we are going to quote him so as to outline this
distinctive point of view:
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they
structure  incentives  in human  exchange,  whether political,  social  or  economic.
Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the
key to understanding historical change. [...] 
[…]   Organizations   are   created   with   purposive   intent   in   consequence   of   the
opportunity set resulting from the existing set of constraints (institutional ones as
21 Keohane and Nye (2000) tackle the encompassing features of globalism nowadays. 
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well as the traditional ones of economic theory) and in the course of attempts to
accomplish their objectives are a major agent of institutional change ”
Narrowing down the subject: Institutional Liberalism
As from now, our line of research turns to the liberal approach and gives
heed to one distinctive development within this frame of mind, that has
been called “institutional liberalism”. As Zacher and Matthew (1995)
argue:
While the body of international institutions that promotes liberal values is a central
dependent variable of liberal scholarship, it is also seen by liberals as an important
independent variable that affects the likelihood of further cooperation.  
From this standpoint, a minimal set of rules and formal institutions
based on common interest and values cement a society of states.
Besides, it is stressed the role of international organizations and their
prescriptive regimes. 
The   institutionalist   approach   states   that   institutions   contribute   to
improve cooperation through quality of information, the decrease of
transaction costs, also by enhancing law enforcement and fostering the
ethical   concerns   of   states.   Hence,   international   institutions   are
predicated upon the role for them to perform so to attain common goals
in world politics.
An outstanding representative of this strand of thought, Robert Keohane
(1984), remarked that 
institutionalists could interpret the liberal international arrangements for trade and
international finance as responses to the need for policy coordination created by the
fact   of   interdependence.   These   arrangements,which   we   will   call   “international
regimes”, contained rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures.
7.2  THE POWER-CONCENTRATION PARADOX
One of the most powerful tool of analysis that links institutions with
governance has been advanced by MacIntyre (2003), through the so-
called “power concentration paradox”. His proposal proves useful not
only for democracies, but also for semi-democracies and even non-
democratic states (see Exhibit 5). 
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Exhibit 5   Eligible variables to establish the power-concentration paradox
To grasp the paradox, let us imagine an horizontal axis that shows at
the right side a hypothetical nation in which authority and decision-
making processes are widely spread through, while at the left side we
could place another hypothetical nation in which authority and decision-
making   processes   are   strongly   concentrated.   In   between   these
extremes, the nations of the world can be located. How can we measure
the relative concentration of authority and control in decision-making?
Below the horizontal axis, we show some of the most tractable variables
to deal with this topic.
If we now give heed to the vertical axis, we will place at the lower level
a hypothetical nation with almost no potential governance problems,
while at the upper level it will stay an ideal nation in which the most
worrying troubles in governance could evolve eventually. In between,
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Source: R. Apreda  -  Center for the Study of Public and Private Governance  - University of Cema
POTENTIAL GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
AUTHORITY AND DISPERSAL OF DECISION-MAKING 
CONTROL 
THE TENSION BETWEEN 
POWER-
CONCENTRATION AND  
GOVERNANCE
ELIGIBLE VARIABLES: number of political parties and veto-players, 
representation systems, collective actors, coalitions, separation of power, 
regulatory burden.
ELIGIBLE VARIABLES: checks and balances, presidential decrees, 
executive constraints, constitutional review, law enforcement, speech 
and press freedom, corrupcion indexes, gobernability indexes, 
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the nations of the world find their address outright. As regards the ways
open   to   measure   the   potential   governance   problems,   the   main
underlying variables are deployed in the upper box.  
Starting from a point where authority and decision-making are fully
concentrated,   and  reaching  the  opposite   side   where  authority   and
decision-making   is   fully   fragmented,   we   face   a   continuum   of
intermediate   stages   that   combine   these   two   extremes.   Therefore,
MacIntyre lays bare a consequential relationship between those stages
and the national political architecture translated by what we have called
public governance. 
Following Exhibit 6, we can easily grasp the intuition behind the paradox
of power concentration: 
Source: R. Apreda  -  Center for the Study of Public and Private Governance  - University of Cema
POTENTIAL GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS





Exhibit 6  The Power-Concentration Paradox
a) If authority and decision-making power were highly concentrated,
then the government would gain in decisiveness and flexibility, but at
the same time the potential for governance would increase, because the
uneasiness of political and economic stakeholders fosters instability.
Such is the environment we usually find in authoritarian regimes, or
Latin   American   countries:   strong   presidential   tradition   with   utter
disregard for checks and balances on the side of Parliament and the
Judiciary.   
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b) In the other extreme, if authority and decision-making power were
severely fragmented (high level of dispersal in Exhibit 6), then the
political   architecture   would   gain   in   predictability   and   credible
commitments but at the cost of mounting rigidity or inaction. 
It is the underlying tension between the governmental decision-making
power and the potential for governance problems that brings about the
paradox of the concentration of power. To put it in MacIntyre own
words:
Thus, on one hand, a country whose political framework fragments control over
policy and disperses power widely among a range of political actors maximizes its
ability to make policy commitments that are credible into the future. This is because,
once made, achieving a new political consensus among all the various actors whose
agreement is necessary is very difficult. [ … ] The more power is fragmented, the
greater the risk that policy rigidity will prevail. But again, the converse is no less
problematic. A country whose political system concentrates control over policy tightly
in the hands of the national executive maximizes its ability to respond in a flexible
and nimble fashion to both routine and unexpected policy problems. [ … ] But the
potential   price   of   an   institutional   framework   that   maximizes   flexibility   is   the
likelihood of volatility and even arbitrariness , with policy being subject to ready
change or reversal and planning on the basis of expectations about the future policy
environment becoming extremely difficult.
 
7.3  POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNANCE
In a cutting-edge analysis of the political determinants behind corporate
governance,  Mark  Roe (2003) has argued that there  are manifold
connections between the ownership structure and governance design of
for-profit organizations in the private sector and the political context of
the host country. Political constraints are consequential, to the extent of
fostering separation ownership from control or not, even to the extent of
preventing firms from growth and wealth. 
Which, it may be asked, are the main political determinants of corporate
governance?  Among  the   most   influential   ones,  we  can   record   the
following: decisions about who owns the firm; the size it can reach; how
it get access to finance; the way management and employees carry out
their   relationship;   who   are   the   strongest   stakeholders;   how   the
authority and control mechanisms are brought home.
We have to bear in mind that multinational corporations are distinctive
and   powerful   non-state   actors   in   world   politics.   They   have   a
transnational reach and carry out their daily operations cutting across
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boundaries.   Therefore,   most   corporations   has   to   delve   with   quite
different political setting at any time, from a liberal democracy like the
ones   we   find   in   countries   that   follow   the   Anglo   Saxon   style   of
governance, through countries that encompass the features that convey
the German or Latin styles of governance. 
It is not surprising the contrasting properties exhibited by these styles
of governance, which lead to a continuum of political arrangements
showing at the starting point liberal and representative democracies
(like United States, United Kingdom, Canada), and at their final point
stronger social democracies (like the Scandinavian countries).
Social democracies  are weighty actors in world politics, not only
because   continental   European   countries   embody   the   closest
approximation to such concept, but also due to the fact that the
greatest in number of developing and emerging countries follow suit
when choosing their political own arrangements. Therefore, it is worthy
of being recalled what we do mean when dealing with this expression. In
general, it stands for a political system in which
 some sort of representative democracy is enacted;
 although private property is granted, it becomes contingent to
social claims;
 the government is a big player in the economy;
 distributional policies are fostered by and large;
 in conflicts arising between employees and capital-owners, the
former are usually the winners;
 management aligns with employees on the grounds of ideology
and culture;
 in general, stakeholders are preferred to shareholders;
 it avoids and discourages changes in companies that could disrupt
social peace. 
Choosing the political placement of richest nation´s governments as an
independent  variable, and ownership concentration as a dependent
variable, Roe found a regression line with an adjusted R-squared of 0.39
(Exhibit 7). This means that politics explains 39 per cent of the variation
in ownership concentration.
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Source: Mark Roe - Political Determinants of Corporate Governance - page 51
 
 
Political Determinants of Governance  -  First Regression
Exhibit 7  The first regression
By the same token, if we picked up the strength of employment security
as the independent  variable, and regress it against the ownership
structure, then the R-squared would amount to 0.64, which tells us that
employment   protection   explains   64   per   cent   of   the   variation   in
ownership concentration (Exhibit 8).
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Source: Mark Roe - Political Determinants of Corporate Governance, page 52
Political Determinants of Governance  - Second Regression
Exhibit 8  The second regression
Are there political consequences when globalization and international
competition increase? It is for Roe to answer in the affirmative: 
Owners may get product market rents in the first instance, but they might be unable
to keep them. The other players, such as the employees, want representation when
the political decisions are made to divide up these rents. Social democratic ideology
is a statement that the rents belong primarily to the employees. You would expect
less social democracy in big, democratic, technologically advanced countries with
strong product market competition. And globalization, by squeezing rents, changes
what is up for grabs inside the firm, globalization weakens the social democratic
parties and the polity´s demand for the related corporate and labor laws.
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7.4  GOVERNANCE INDEXES 
Governance matters, as Kaufmann et al. (1999) argued, because there
is a distinctive causal relationship between good governance on the one
hand, national growth and development issues on the other hand. It is a
foremost implication of this standpoint that we need indexes to assess
the performance in private, public and global governance.  For the sake
of illustration, let us give some heed to the World Bank´s approach to
public governance issues, which brings to light a sound methodological
framework   to   deal   with   the   manifold   problems   underlying   the
governance of the public sector. Exhibit 9 intends to give a picture of
this sort of benchmark.
7.5 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND  REGIMES 
Although the world system is anarchic in the sense that it lacks a central
authority,   states   engage   themselves   in   ordered   and   cooperative
behavior through the active intermediation of a host of institutions, as
well as a network of treatises within the encompassing setting  of
international law. 
By international law is meant a mechanism that smoothes interactions
between   states   as   they   follow   rules,   contracts,   procedures,   and
regulations. International law grew out of the Peace of Westphalia; in
fact, it made states legitimate actors on their own. 
In the international system, no central authority is able to enforce the
empire of the law, albeit there are indirect mechanisms of enforcement
and reciprocity, from retaliation measures to the compliance of treaties
and the fulfillment of international law.  
It is worthy of being recalled that the Statute of the International Court
of Justice points to the main sources of international law:
a) international conventions or treaties;
b) customs;
c) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
It   also   includes   as   secondary   sources   the   judicial   decisions   of
international courts and legal scholarship.
Ratner (1998) remarked that the notion of “soft-law” is instrumental to
grasp   the   essential   relationship   between   international   law   and
international   institutions.   By   “soft-law”   is   meant   the   structure   of
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precepts produced by international bodies that match expectations of
required behavior albeit they are not binding on states.
Exhibit 9 The World Bank´s Approach to Governance
Following this line of analysis, the idea of regime  was a natural by-
product of international law and encompasses structures of rules and
norms, more or less informal, which relate to some distinctive area of
international relations
22. It has received a promising development from
many contributors during the last two decades. For instance, Robert
Keohane (1984) defines regimes as a complex structure of principles,
22 More background in International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?, by R.
Keohane   (1998).   Young   (1980)   has   undertaken   a   deep   study   of   international
regimes.
29
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
TO COPE WITH PUBLIC GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
o First dimension of analysis
  The process of selecting, monitoring, and replacing governments.
Associated measurable concepts:
a) Voice  and  external  accountability  through  citizens  feedback,  democratic
institutions and a competitive press.
b) Political stability and lack of violence, crime and terrorism.
o Second dimension of analysis
  The capacity to formulate and implement sound policies, and deliver 
public services.
Associated measurable concepts:
a) Government effectiveness (including quality of policymaking, bureaucracy,
and public service delivery).
b) Lack of regulatory burden.
o Third dimension of analysis
The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them.
Associated measurable concepts:
a) Rule of law (protection of property rights, judiciary independence).
b) Control of corruption.
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norms,   rules,   and   decision-making   procedures   around   which   actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area.
At this juncture, international law and regimes become embedded in the
wider circle of governance, as Exhibit 10 intends to illustrate
23.   In
general, there is a distinctive match between regimes and issue-areas,
by which the latter become the scope of the former. 
Exhibit 10  Global governance and Regimes 
Taking a step further, Keohane makes clear the meaning of the four
components in the definition: 
Principles beliefs of facts, causation or rectitude;
they translate the purposes expected to
be pursued by international actors.
23 This Exhibit adapts one used by Reus-Smit (1997) on fundamental institutions, to
which we have marked out their inception with a global governance design.
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Source: Adapted from Reus-Smit (1997) -  Center for the Study of Public and Private Governance  - Ucema
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Norms standards of behavior defined in terms of
rights and obligations.
Rules specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action.
Decision-making procedures prevailing practices for making and
implementing collective choice.
7.6  ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND GOOD 
PRACTICES
Accountability is a relational notion, that is to say, it involves two
parties, each of which can be single or complex. Usually, it comes to be
defined
24  as the state of being responsible or answerable, but this
neglects a crucial component that makes for the foundation of this
notion: the underlying commitments. Hence, it seems advisable to
shape a more comprehensive meaning [this has earlier been done in
Apreda (2003), (2005b)].
Definition 5 Accountability
By accountability is meant a relationship between two parties that can
be broken down into complementary layers of practice, the first one
before the facts evolve, the other one while the fact evolve or come to
fulfillment:
a) Ex-ante practice: one party commits something to be done
on behalf of another.
b) Ex-post practice: by which the same party is responsible for
the performance of his commitment to the other.
To   put   this   in   other   words,   accountability   deals   not   only   with
responsibility,   as   it   is   customarily   stressed,   but   with   a   previous
commitment from which the responsibility lastly stems from. In keeping
with   accountability,   transparency   must   necessarily   be   brought   into
focus.
For the information to be  transparent, we request from it to be
produced in timely, reliably, meaningful, and testable fashion, with full
disclosure of sources.    
24 See, for instance, the Black´s Law Dictionary.
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The more transparency we assure, the higher levels of accountability we
attain. This feature must be coupled with another one that becomes
consequential in every day applications: good-practices codes. 
It goes without saying that these codes are double-edged swords. On
the one hand, they could be suitable to match their expected functions
that intend to set governance in motion. But on the other hand, they
could be devices that only pay a lip service to governance and become a
vehicle to deceive and trespass not only the underlying principles of
governance to which they pretend to translate but, even worse, the law
and the international arrangements as well. 
Hence, at the root of good practices there is an essential claim: how
could we make accountability and transparency functional to the codes?
The definition
25 that comes next intends match the request.
Definition 6 Codes of Good Practices
By a  Code of Good Practices,  we understand any set of rules of
behavior that allow a distinctive governance structure to be put into
practice  and  held  accountable,  provided that such  rules  meet  the
following constraints:
· by   necessity,   they   stem   from   the   underlying   governance
structure;
· they   match   the   institutional   framework   within   which   the
organization not only lives and develops, but also abides by the
law;
· they are in agreement with the organization Charter and its by-
laws;
· they become fully operational: the rules are set up within a
framework that allows for disclosure, monitoring, assessment,
enforcement, updating, and improvement.
By way of illustration (see Exhibit 11), we are going to give the outlines
of a code of good practices that is currently used among OECD countries
and that has got the voluntary endorsement of an increasing number of
25 It is worthy of being remarked that the definition explicitly takes into account the
requirements of accountability and transparency.
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developing countries. We are speaking about the International Monetary
Fund Code on Fiscal Transparency.
Exhibit 11  The International Monetary Fund Code of Good Practices 
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
REVISED CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES ON FISCAL
TRANSPARENCY
CLARITY OF ROLES AND RESPONSABILITIES
o The government sector should be distinguished from the rest of the
public   sector   and   from   the   rest   of   the   economy,   and   policy   and
management roles within the public sector should be clear and publicly
disclosed.
o There should be a clear legal and administrative framework for fiscal
management.
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
o The public should be provided with full information on the past, current
and projected fiscal activity of government.
o A   commitment   should   be   made   to   the   timely   publication   of   fiscal
information.
OPEN BUDGET PREPARATION, EXECUTION, AND REPORTING
o The budget documentation should specify fiscal policy objectives, the
macroeconomic   framework,   the   policy   basis   for   the   budget,   and
identifiable major fiscal risks.
o Budget information should be presented in a way that facilitates policy
analysis and promotes accountability.
o Procedures for the execution and monitoring of approved expenditure
and for collecting revenue should be clearly specified. 
o There should be regular fiscal reporting to the legislature and the public.
ASSURANCES OF INTEGRITY
o Fiscal data should meet accepted data quality standards. 
o Fiscal information should be subjected to independent scrutiny.It is for Global Governance to Sharpen Up International Relations                 Dr. Rodolfo Apreda
8. IT IS FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE TO FULFILL A FIDUCIARY
ROLE 
By fiduciary actor is usually meant
 
“one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence and
candor” (The Black´s Law Dictionary)
A natural extension is given by the same source, and it applies to any
fiduciary relationship, in which “one actor is under a duty to perform for
the   benefit   of   other   actor,   on   matters   within   the   scope   of   the
relationship.” 
Noteworthy examples of such relationships are found in those that link
trustees   with   beneficiaries,   agents   with   principals,   attorneys   and
auditors with clients, banks with depositors, elected representatives with
their constituencies, international government organizations with their
founding countries.
What do I understand by fiduciary role in the framework of global
governance?
Global governance organizations carry out the fiduciary role
when they systematically and formally contribute to:  
a) manage  the   conflicting   interests   and  goals   of   political
actors;
b) curb sources of their disagreement or  misunderstanding;
c) help to build incentives for cooperation and trust;
d) stand up for granting the reliability of commitments;
e) provide a neutral interface to negotiations;
f) smoothen   over   pervasive   suspicions   or   misperceptions
from counterparts;
g) monitor and update frameworks of mutual accountability
and transparency.   
If we tried to find pragmatic dimensions to make these prescriptions
operational and tractable, we would point to the following ones:  
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· international law and regimes;
· accountability, transparency and good practices;
· international organizations;
· soft power;
· epistemic communities 
In section 7, we gave heed to the first two dimensions. In this section,
our purpose is to show how the remaining pragmatic dimensions help to
bring about nothing less than the fulfillment of the fiduciary role.
International Organizations
26 
They actually turn out to be instruments of cooperation because they
can successfully handle those distinctive issues arising from collective
action, for which similar attempts from single states usually end in
failure. It is recognized that such organizations perform two broad
functions
27:
a) Centralization, by which they can exhibit a stable structure and a
highly   specialized   bureaucracy,   which   lead   them   to   make
collective decision-making more efficiently.
b) Independence, that is to say, organizations can act with autonomy
in certain areas, to the extent of claiming higher degrees of
neutrality.     
Governance structures shape actor´s strategies and goals; besides, they
mediate relations of cooperation and political conflicts.
Soft Power
As for  soft power, being Nye (2004) the scholar who coined this
expression in 1990, let us recall how he defined it:
What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather
than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,
political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of
others, our soft power is enhanced. 
Therefore,   while   hard   power   hangs   on   inducements   (“carrots”)   or
threats (“sticks”), soft power co-opts people since it relies on the ability
26 For a helpful account of how institutions shape politics, see Steinmo et al. (1992),
mainly chapter 1, about historical institutionalism in comparative politics.
27 This view is advanced by Abbot and Snidal (1998), in depth.
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to reshape the preferences of other political actors 
28. In other words,
changing others minds by means of reason not coercion, manipulation
or actual sanctions. 
Non-governmental   organizations   like   corporations,   universities,
churches, scientific and artistic foundations, sports and entertainment
groups, increasingly make use of soft power in their activities with a
global reach.  
Fostering   freedom,   representative   democracies,   political   liberalism,
justice and human rights, a safer global environment, all of them
become soft-power drivers, which the global governance approach bring
into play when accomplishing its fiduciary role.   
Epistemic Communities
At the root of the fiduciary role, the political actor makes a pledge of
expertise, proficiency, reliability and accountability. Frequently, it is for
international   policy-makers   to   cope   with   manifold   obstacles   and
problems,   which   are   mainly   rooted   in   the   uncertainties   and   the
complexities of the situations involved. At the core of this difficulty, real
life   contests  the   actual   ability   of  policymakers   to   identify  national
interests and to deal with domestic political and social pressures. This is
where the notion of epistemic communities comes in handy.
Epistemic communities turn out to be networks of knowledge-based
experts that, among other tasks, deal with the following:
· searching   for   cause-and-effect   relationships   out   of   complex
environments;
· singling out feasible state interests;
· setting up functional frameworks to collective debate;
· designing consequential policies;
· distinguishing valuable information from background noise;
· choosing   key-points   and   groundbreaking   issues   to   carry   out
negotiations.
It was Peter Haas (1992) who narrowed down the notion of an epistemic
community as
28 It is worthy of being read what Nye (2004) brings forth about the need of reshaping
public diplomacy as a vehicle of soft power.
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a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge with that domain or
issue-area.
Therefore,   decision-makers   request   advice   from   members   of   an
epistemic community either at national or international level. On the
other hand, the community can influence decision-makers to reach
convergent   behavior   from   states   as   well   as   international   policy
coordination. 
The epistemic community’s idea stems from the liberal tradition that
regards as the main purposes of any state not only security, power,
survival and wealth, but also uncertainty reduction, the management of
misperceptions and credible commitments, the widening and sharing of
common knowledge.
 
9. IT IS FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE TO ACT AS A BROKER OF
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION  
In the toolbox of governance analysis, accountability and transparency
are outstanding, and both lead us to the primary notion of information
set (Exhibit 12).
By the information set of a political actor E(k), at date t, currently
denoted by 
W t, k.
we understand all the available information to which he can get access
to, up to that moment
29.
 
Source: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda  -  Cegopp  -  University of Cema
The 
information set 
of the political 
actor  
E (k)
W  k , t
Exhibit 12   The information set
29 A detailed development in Apreda (2001).
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Now, let us turn to asymmetric information. With the help of Exhibit 13
we can move on to grasp the intuition behind this important concept,
whose definition we framed elsewhere (Apreda, 2001) under this guise: 
Asymmetric information refers to the advantage one party can enjoy
by having an information set that is different from their counterparts´
ones, so as to improve the ensuing trade or relationship for his own
benefit.
Whenever two or more political actors interact among them, information
trading is at stake. In the subject matter of this paper, this amounts to
power and international arrangements to be negotiated. To illustrate the
point, let us take the hypothetical situation in which two westphalian
states Ak and Pj engage each other in international relations, by means
of their information endowments at date t, a context we are going to
denote as
< Ak ; W t , k >  and  < Pj ; W t , j >
 
Ak shares information with Pj   only to the extent of the set of common
knowledge that comes defined by the intersection of their information
sets. But there are areas of private information, which they do not own
jointly.   To   say   the   least,   this   setting   is   complex,   since   private
information that belongs to one country and not to the other country
could be relevant or irrelevant to their joint affairs, contingent upon
contexts of non-neutral interpretations. What if private information in
the field of Ak is withheld from Pj   because there are reasons for such
behavior, ranging from strategic issues, to opportunistic behavior with
guile. It goes without saying that political actors are regarded, in the
current literature about international relations, as forward-looking and
end-seeking decision-making units. 
It is a striking fact of life that credible commitments and cooperation do
not only hinge upon symmetric information provided by the common
knowledge set, but on the asymmetric information as well. 
What   is   the   function   of   global   governance   as   far   as   asymmetric
information is concerned? 
Global governance steps here in to help political actors to not
only   broaden   their   joint   information,   but   also   to   design
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
30. In a
nutshell,   it   is   governance   which   drives   the   brokerage   of
30 We are extrapolating the frame of reference laid upon regimes by Keohane, to the
wider field of governance, as it is depicted in exhibit 10.
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asymmetric   information   to   set   up   trustworthy   international
relations.
Exhibit 13   Asymmetric Information
In order to make clear how a global governance structure mediates
between two or more political actors, I will outline some characteristics
to be found in some relevant subsets that come depicted in the Exhibit
14 below
31. In this setting, we assume that two Westphalian states are
mediated by a governance agent. 
Subset 1  It is the common knowledge set, where the two political
actors and the governance actor can reach agreement. It
31 The reader is referred to Apreda (2001) for the foundations of this viewpoint, and to
Apreda (2005a) for an outright application to Financial Economics.
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provides with the minimal information required to draw out,
discuss,   implement  and make   enforceable   any   contract,
convention, regime, treaty, or the like.
Source: Dr. Rodolfo Apreda  -  Cegopp  -  University of Cema
E 1
E 2
ORGANIZATION PERFORMING AS INTERMEDIARY  
IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
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Exhibit 13  The intermediary role of global governance
Subset 5 Here we can find private information that belongs to the
political actor E  1  , with a further qualification: it is not
shared either with the other political actor or the governance
actor. It is the source of opportunistic behavior of E1  that
could impair the relationship with its counterparts.
Subset 3 This is information that could be owned jointly by E 2 and the
governance actor, albeit E1 does not get access to it. It is a
source of suspicion and misperceptions for the actor left
outside.
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Subset 4 In this area, both political parties can share information but
the governance actor is prevented from getting access to.
Subset 4 is extremely important since many failures in
international   relations   could   be   tracked   down   to   this
asymmetry,   by   which   an   arbitrator   or   international
organization  trying  to  settle   a  dispute  between  political
actors is overstepped or cheated by them.
Now,   how   could   the   governance   actor   enhance   the   reliability   of
relationships, the accountability of counterparts, and the transparency
of their behavior? If we shift our attention to Exhibit 14, some guidelines
will be brought to light.
An intuition behind the picture is clear: global governance intends to
broaden the scope of jointly owned information by lessening, firstly, the
asymmetric information in subsets like 2, 3, 4 and, secondly, exerting
pressure on the more private realms of private information. That is to
say, over 5, 7 and even the subset 6 that pertains to the governance
actor itself
32. 
If   we   tried   to   deal   with   affordable   paths   of   action   for   a   global
governance   actor   to   make   the   circle   expandable   and   spreading
outwards, we would point out that four out of the six procedural tools
reviewed in section 7 come in handy so as to accomplish the task
eventually. 
Let us expand further on this issue, by piecing together the four
methodologies in turn.
i. The Economic Approach to Institutions
This approach has been evolving for the last three decades, shifting to a
distinctive   viewpoint,   the   International   Political   Economy
33,   which
engages in the real-world connections between politics and economics.
It expands on how the governance actor tries to influence and persuade
westphalian states and non-state organizations, about the advantage of
rebuilding their institutions to meet the requirements of representative
democracies, globalism and interdependence.
32 What amounts to the accountability and transparency of the global governance actor.  
33 For a lively statement of this shift, see Katzenstein et al. (1998).
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THE INTERMEDIARY ROLE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Exhibit 14 The intermediary role of global governance
When we seek for empirical evidence, the contributions of the so-called
Comparative Economics and Politics bring to light that we can learn a lot
from   institution-building  around   the   planet,   and   global   governance
becomes a booster for institutional change.
ii. The Power-Concentration Paradox
What is the final lesson of the power-concentration paradox? For all
intents and purposes, it teaches us some consequential lessons:
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a) as long as a country embraces freedom and democracy, and
its institutions become stronger, the impact of the paradox
lessens outright;
 
b) since   the   relationship   between   levels   of   dispersal   of
authority   and   decision-making   control,   with   potential
governance problems becomes non-linear, the lower arc of
the curve (Exhibit 6) is the sounder place for a country to
stay;
c) each nation-state should not shrink from making changes in
their political architectures so as to balance their decision-
making control and their exercise of authority with likely
governance problems; 
d) governance actors are the brokers in charge of managing
the   settlements,   arrangements   and   commitments   that
shape the best trade off in the power-concentration paradox
for political actors in international relations. 
iii. Political Determinants of Governance
Global governance is a two-tiered structure, in which private and public
governances mutually reinforce each other, and at the same time,
establish a reciprocal feedback with global constructs. 
The political determinants of governance allow for differences among
countries in their political arrangements related to private and collective
action. This is the starting point for global governance structures to
build up reliability on the grounds of two reasons:
a) global governance actors fulfill a fiduciary role on behalf of
political actors in need of common knowledge and unbiased
basic perceptions;
b) it is from the fiduciary role that global governance partners
can   make   a   credible   pledge   to   mediate   asymmetric
information to lay foundations for long-lasting agreements.
iv. Governance Indexes
When the manifold performance of states is measured by means of
distinctive indexes, the global governance actor can take a big step
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further to sensibly contract with political actors. Indexes bring pressures
to countries, because the best ranked outpace the remaining ones,
which turn less and less transparent or accountable. Indexes furnishes
world politics analysis and practice with a sort of “who´s who” in
international relations measured out of distinctive patterns of behavior.
Lastly, indexes become functional since they signal characteristics by
means of a “name and shame” mechanism. Global governance actors
are the main producers of indexes.    
CONCLUSIONS
Governance   structures   in   global   contexts   of   interdependence   and
cooperation become key players, by supplying courses of action and
procedural instruments to world politics. 
Among the manifold courses of action along which the governance
approach  proves  to   be  functional,  this  paper has  pointed  out  the
following:
· fostering accountability and transparency among actors;
· coping with the power concentration paradox;  
· improving international law and regimes;
· helping   the   progress   and   spreading   of   representative
democracies;
· furthering the employment of soft power to enhance sustainable
relations among states;
· working out and educating about the political determinants of
governance;
As far as the procedural instruments is concerned, we have expanded
on the fiduciary role and the brokerage of asymmetric information,
arguing that these functions are at the root of the governance approach
to international relations. 
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